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Structural Racism, Institutional Agency, and Disrespect
-Andrew J. Pierce

ABSTRACT: In recent work, Joshua Glasgow has offered a definition of racism that is supposed
to put to rest the debates between cognitive, behavioral, attitudinal, and institutionalist
definitions. The key to such a definition, he argues, is the idea of disrespect. He claims: “ϕ is
racist if and only if ϕ is disrespectful toward members of racialized group R as Rs.” While this
definition may capture an important commonality among cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal
accounts of racism, I argue that his attempt to expand the definition to cover institutional or
“structural” racism is less persuasive. Alternatively, I argue that structural racism must be
understood in terms of injustice rather than disrespect. This involves giving a fuller account of
how institutions are related to the beliefs, actions, and intentions of individuals, and thus how
they can come to embody a certain kind of agency.

In contemporary race theory and recent social and political philosophy
generally, the proper understanding of racism has been a matter of significant
contention. On the one hand, racism has been variously conceived in terms of
belief, behavior, volition, and psychosexual aversion, just to name some of the
main candidates. What these conceptions share, despite their differences, is that
they attempt to explain and understand the racism of individuals. In this sense,
one might consider them micro-analyses of racism. On the other hand, racism has
been understood in structural or institutional terms1, as a system of power that
disadvantages some to the benefit of others. These conceptions attempt to explain
the racism of social structures and institutions rather than individuals. In this
sense then, one might consider them macro-analyses of racism. However, far from
the image of complementary perspectives that the language of ‘micro’ and
‘macro-analyses’ suggests, these two perspectives are often understood as
competing conceptions, not least because the two approaches lend themselves to
different conceptual frameworks and methodologies; individualist approaches
tend to favor moral, ethical, or psychological methods, and structuralist
approaches tend to favor socio-political and economic methods. Typically then,
each approach will attempt to show how the other is derivative: institutions are
1

racist insofar as they embody the racist beliefs, intentions, etc. of individuals, or
individuals are racist insofar as they support and benefit from racist power
structures, and so on.
Recently, Joshua Glasgow has made a significant contribution to the
growing literature attempting to define racism.2 He argues for a “monistic”
definition that can capture the ordinary use of the term in all of its variety, and
thus put to rest the debates between cognitive, behavioral, affective (or
“attitudinal” as he has it), and structural approaches to defining racism. The key to
such a definition, he argues, is the idea of disrespect. He offers, then, the
following definition: “ϕ is racist if and only if ϕ is disrespectful toward members
of racialized group R as Rs.”3 The chief advantage of this definition over previous
attempts is supposedly that ϕ here can refer to any number of the things that we
might want to call racist: beliefs, attitudes, actions, persons, institutions, policies,
countries, and so on. I will argue that while Glasgow’s definition may capture an
important commonality among cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal accounts of
racism (all of which he understands as “agent-based” accounts), his attempt to
expand this definition to cover structural racism is at best incomplete, since it fails
to explain how institutions can express disrespect. That is, insofar as the ability to
show respect (and therefore the ability to fail to show respect) requires a certain
kind of moral agency, the claim that institutions and other non-human entities are
capable of disrespect implies that they possess this kind of agency, a claim that
Glasgow fails to demonstrate. In what follows then, I consider two models for
understanding institutional agency and its relation to individual agency. However,
even with the aid of these models, it becomes clear that structural racism cannot
be fully captured by the idea of disrespect. Rather, structural racism must be
understood as an injustice, one which can obtain even if a particular institution
does not disrespect those it disadvantages. I thus conclude that a bifurcated or
“dual perspective” account of racism is preferable to monistic accounts like
Glasgow’s.
I.

RESPECT AS A CAPABILITY OF PERSONS.

As Kant has made especially clear, respect is a fundamental feature of moral
agency, a feature that is distinctively human.4 It makes little sense to see an
earthquake or hurricane as being disrespectful to the individuals it harms. Nor
does an animal that attacks a human do so out of a lack of respect for human life,
or for that particular human life. Respect, and so disrespect, is a human capacity,
part of a uniquely human moral sensibility. It is not my intent, nor Glasgow’s, to
argue for a particular understanding of what respect or disrespect entails. My only
claim here is that respect and disrespect, whatever they entail, have their source in
human moral agency. This claim, however, raises questions about other
applications of the concept, since disrespect is often predicated of various nonhuman as well as human entities: laws and policies, states of affairs, institutions
and so on. If it is true that the capacity for respect is ultimately located in human
persons, then laws, institutions, and so on, if they are disrespectful, are so only in
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a derivative sense, insofar as they come to embody the disrespectful motives,
attitudes, or beliefs of persons.
Glasgow calls this a reductionist view, and distinguishes between two
varieties. “Time-slice” reductionism holds that an institution or other non-human
entity is disrespectful if and only if, at time T, it is animated by the disrespect of
individual persons. So, in the case of racial disrespect (which Glasgow argues is
coextensive with racism) an institution could only be considered racist if it
currently possessed members, directors, authors, etc. that actively supplied its
racist motives. Glasgow rightly rejects time-slice reductionism, which implausibly
suggests that a racist institution would “magically” become nonracist once the last
racist member dies.5 At most, such an institution might, insofar as it was truly non
(or better, anti-) racist, gain the motivation to eliminate and restructure its racist
practices, policies, etc., but those practices and policies will not change
automatically (nor magically) simply because of changes in the beliefs and
attitudes of the individuals associated with it.
“Genetic” reductionism, on the other hand, seeks to trace institutional
disrespect to disrespectful individuals in the institution’s history or origins. So, in
the case of racial disrespect, an institution is racist if and only if its practices,
policies, and so on were at one time motivated by racist individuals, and those
practices and policies remain in force. Glasgow finds this a more plausible
approach, but still argues that whether or not one can identify in the history of
racist institutions some individual racist beliefs and attitudes, the present racism
of those institutions is sometimes separable from those beliefs and attitudes. That
is, one might grant that an institution has a history of racially disrespectful
individuals, but still recognize that what makes an institution racist now is that it
has certain effects in the present, and not that it is contingently traceable to the
beliefs and actions of past associates. So, Glasgow admits of the possibility at
least of so-called “pure” cases of institutional racism, as exemplified in his Real
Estate example, to which I will now turn.
Real Estate. For centuries, members of R1 systematically targeted the economic
resources of members of R2 for (unjust) suppression, first through a state-supported
system of slavery, then through a state-supported system of segregation. Eventually, there
was a racial rapprochement, where all state-supported means of R2’s economic
repression (including criminal laws, voting rights, and tax-and-transfer schemes) were
abolished. However, the rapprochement was not complete in the sense that no reparations
were made to members of R2, and therefore the postrapprochement era begins with R1s
uniformly having more wealth than R2s. Two hundred years later, there are no longer any
attitudes, behaviors, or beliefs, among either R1s or R2s, which we would ordinarily
identify as racist. However, there also is no change in mortgage policies, which ensures
that more, and more beneficial, mortgages go to those with better credit ratings, and
better credit ratings are assigned to those with greater assets. As a direct result of this
state of affairs, R2s still have fewer good homes, less wealth, and a weaker sense of
economic security than R1s have.6

Glasgow claims (and I share the intuition) that we should describe this
state of affairs as racist, even though no one involved with the relevant institutions
3

holds any racist attitudes or beliefs. And even though one could trace the
offending practices in this example to the racist attitudes and beliefs of past R1s,
Glasgow insists that those past attitudes do not explain why the practice is racist
in the present. He thus takes this to be a case of pure institutional racism.
The problem here is that once Glasgow denies that Real Estate’s racism
can be traced to the racially disrespectful attitudes, beliefs, and actions of past
individuals, the link to individual agency is severed, and one can no longer
explain the source of the disrespect. Put another way, “pure” cases of institutional
racism seem to require something like “pure” institutional agency, an agency that
is not traceable to the agency of individual moral agents, past or present. At worst
this is an absurd consequence. At best it stands in need of further explanation. In
the next section I introduce two ways of understanding this relationship between
individual and institutional agency, one based in the social contract tradition, and
the other drawing from Habermas’ sociology of system and lifeworld. This will
help us to determine if the idea of “pure” institutional racism can be salvaged.
II.

TWO MODELS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL AGENCY

Perhaps the most familiar way of accounting for institutional agency is found in
the theory of the social contract. Social contract theory, as found in Hobbes and
Locke especially, provides a model for how the rational autonomy of individuals
is “transferred” to a sovereign institutional body (even if this is just the “body” of
one individual, the sovereign, it can still be thought of as institutional rather than
individual, as Hobbes makes especially clear), through consent. On this model,
the ability of a sovereign body to act as an agent, for example, in making laws, or
determining punishments for transgressing laws, is derived from the “natural”
powers of individuals, including the power of autonomy or self-legislation (the
ultimate source of legislative powers) and the power to punish offenses to oneself
(the ultimate source of executive power). Despite significant differences in the
way Hobbes and Locke explicate these powers (concerning, for example, whether
they ought to be separated into several institutions or combined in one absolute
power, whether individuals can or should relinquish the right to ongoing input
into these institutions, and so on), the idea that the power of political institutions
comes from the consent of the individuals that they govern represents the
revolutionary core of social contract theory. Though it may not be typically
understood in such terms then, social contract theory can be seen as providing an
account of how individual agency can be “institutionalized” in a certain way. That
is, when a group of individuals agree to establish an institution, defined by certain
social roles and allocated certain powers, and when these individuals further agree
to recognize the acts of such an institution as legitimate and binding (at least
amongst themselves), it becomes possible to understand such an institution as
possessing an independent, institutional agency. Call this the contract model of
institutional agency.
This model invokes the idea of a contract for the purposes of explanation
rather than justification. These two functions of contract theory are often
4

conflated, but nonetheless distinct. It is conceivable, for example, that some group
of persons could contractually establish an institution intentionally designed to
dominate, oppress, or exploit another group of persons. The question of whether
such an institution is morally legitimate is distinct from the question of whether
the contract model usefully illuminates the process that gives rise to it. Indeed,
regarding institutional racism, I presume, as will most readers, that the institutions
that are appropriately labeled as such are illegitimate. This has little to do with
whether the contract model provides a plausible explanation of why such
institutions are racist, or how they come to embody individual morally relevant
features like disrespect.
Charles Mills’ seminal work The Racial Contract provides a clear
example of how the contract model can be used to theorize systematic,
institutionalized racial oppression. Mills argues that racial oppression can be
usefully understood as arising from the conscious, explicit historical agreements
of whites, agreements to colonize, enslave, and expropriate the resources of
nonwhites throughout the world.7 Thus, the theory of the Racial Contract purports
to be descriptive rather than normative, and emphasizes the role of human agency
in the construction of white supremacist social and political institutions. Far from
conflating the explanatory and legitimating functions of contract theory, Mills’
description of the Racial Contract allows us to see why the institutions it gives
rise to are illegitimate: because they arise from agreements that dramatically
affect the lives of many millions of nonwhite people without their consent. Mills’
view can thus be understood as a version of genetic reductionism. His claim is not
that currently living whites have secretly agreed to construct and promote racist
institutions (though he does note that all whites are “beneficiaries” of white
supremacy, whether they support it or not), but that such institutions derive their
agency from past (and some present) “signatories” to the contract, those who do
actively construct and promote them.8
Mills’ theory of the Racial Contract illustrates one of the advantages of the
contract model of institutional agency. It reminds us that the faceless, anonymous
institutions of modern life have human roots, and that their shortcomings and
injustices are thus human shortcomings and injustices. It reminds us that “white
supremacy… is a political artifact, a human construct, an artificial human
contrivance involving elements of choice, deliberation and purpose, brought into
existence by humans and maintained by (some) humans' acquiescence and
support, in short a conventionally-generated human creation.”9 This implies that
such injustices are not inevitable, and that it is possible to hold persons
responsible for them. In the same way, the traditional social contract emphasized
that society itself was an artificial human construction rather than a “natural”
entity, as Aristotle and other Ancients presumed. As a result, social hierarchies
previously thought of as inevitable now appeared as malleable in the interests of
justice and human emancipation. Thus the contract model should at least make
one wary of the idea of “pure” institutional agency, insofar as thinking about
institutions in this way might conceal the human agency that gives rise to them,
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and thus fail to recognize the moral responsibilities and failures of those human
agents.
However, it is also true that in our complex modern world, institutions do
at least seem to take on a “life of their own,” an independent causal efficacy that
might be understood in terms of agency. The “invisible hand” of the market
economy might be thought of as such an independent agent, the enduring
bureaucracy of the State, or even the “culture” of various particular institutions, to
which individuals may feel pressured to conform. Whether or not such
phenomena are actually traceable to the actions of particular individuals (that is,
whether or not genetic reductionism is correct), they often appear as agents in
their own right, which is sufficient to have real effects on the individuals who thus
perceive them, effects which may or may not have been intended by the
individual directors and progenitors of the institution.10 Thus one might think of
the relation of individuals and institutions as reciprocal. True, institutions do not
arise ex nihilo, but from individuals acting in concert. Contract theory usefully
illustrates this process. However, once established, institutions can in turn shape
and influence individuals in unintended ways. For example, the market economy
in advanced capitalist societies not only responds to consumer demands, but plays
a significant role in shaping those demands. The contract model neglects this
important dimension of institutional agency, a dimension that is crucial for
understanding how institutional racism can continue unaffected by changes in
individual beliefs and attitudes. The tradition of structuralism on the other hand,
rooted in Sausserian linguistics, and applied to social theory by Levi-Strauss,
Althusser, Foucault, and others, goes too far in the other direction, seeing
individuals as being completely determined by the structures in which they are
conceived merely as “elements,” “subject-positions,” “iterations,” and so on.
What is needed is a model that captures both dimensions (or perhaps, directions)
of causal effect, and therefore illuminates the complex relationship between
individuals and institutions.
I submit that Habermas’ sociological framework of system and lifeworld
can provide a more accurate and sophisticated model of institutional agency than
the contract model. That is, it captures both that institutions are born from the
collective action of individuals, and that institutions can shape individuals and
individual actions, sometimes in ways that affect their very ability to intentionally
direct those institutions. While I am not aware of anyone who has explicitly done
so, comparing Habermas’ theory with contract theory in this way should not be
particularly surprising.11 Habermas’ career-long task has been to provide a
defense of the Enlightenment project of founding moral and political authority on
a form of rationality that would allow for universal consent, essentially the same
project that gave rise to the original social contract theories. The main differences
lie in the way that Habermas conceives of rationality (as fundamentally
intersubjective, rather than as a capacity of individual subjects), and in his attempt
to take seriously the tradition (from Marx, through Weber, to Habermas’
predecessors in the Frankfurt School of critical theory) that shows how rationality
has been co-opted in the service of oppression and domination. The former aspect
6

(the reconstruction of rationality on intersubjective grounds) culminates in
Habermas’ two-volume Theory of Communicative Action, which demonstrates
that communication oriented toward mutual understanding can provide the basis
for collective guidance of complex social systems.12 To understand society in this
way – as a cooperative, intentionally directed endeavor – is to look at it from the
perspective of the lifeworld. The latter aspect (sensitivity to the potential for
domination inherent in social processes of “rationalization”) leads Habermas,
drawing from the systems theory of Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann, to
theorize the ways in which social systems can develop their own independent
rules and imperatives, which can interfere with and undermine their collective,
intentional direction. Habermas names this latter phenomenon the “colonization
of the lifeworld.” In order to sufficiently compare this model to the more familiar
contract model, it is necessary to say a bit more about the concepts of system and
lifeworld, and the role that they play in Habermas’ theory of communicative
action.
As just noted, the analysis of society from the perspective of the lifeworld
emphasizes the ways in which society is guided by the collective volition of its
members. In Habermas’ own words, it is “the intuitively present…familiar and
transparent, and at the same time vast and incalculable web of presuppositions
that have to be satisfied if an utterance is to be at all meaningful.”13 That is, the
lifeworld is the shared, linguistically mediated “world” that forms the necessary
background against which communication can be successful. The lifeworld thus
marks a kind of implicit agreement, a rather banal one, perhaps, but also a very
important one, since Habermas takes this kind of linguistic agreement to
demonstrate the possibility of a normative perspective in general, one that can be
put to use in moral, political, and legal discourse. However, Habermas warns
against a “hermeneutic idealism” that understands society as a whole in these
intentionalist terms. The lifeworld perspective, he thinks, must be supplemented
by another perspective that theorizes the limits of communicative action, as well
as its impediments. The systems perspective then, takes into account precisely
those tendencies that Weber and early critical theorists saw as all-encompassing.
Modern social systems like the state and the economy do take on their own kind
of instrumental rationality, understood as a means of effectively achieving its
ends, which is separate in principle from the communicative rationality of
collective action. In the first place, this is simply because increasing social
complexity makes direct, intentional control of complex social systems
impossible. Perhaps in small, primitive societies, social organization could be
understood solely in intentional terms. But in modern society, we cannot
exchange goods and services by way of coming to mutual agreement about the
value of goods in each case. So a market economy arises, along with the medium
of money (or, if one prefers, the “commodity form”), to “unburden” the lifeworld
of this demand. Similarly, in large, complex societies, we cannot feasibly come to
agreement about every law or policy that presents itself in the political arena. So a
representative system arises to carry out this task, a system which also has its own
unique form (the form of positive law).
7

Habermas does not find these systems inherently problematic. They arise
to meet the needs of lifeworlds overburdened by social complexity. However, the
instrumental rationality they employ as means to human ends does suffer from the
dangerous tendencies toward domination that early critical theorists identified. An
economic system based on the commodity form, for example, tends by its very
nature to expand beyond its proper scope, since capitalism cannot reproduce itself
except through constant growth. This expansion is both horizontal, seeking out
new markets for goods and services, and vertical, commodifying areas of human
life previously considered sacred, or at least not subject to principles of exchange.
The relinquishing of political authority to professional politicians also tends to
expand beyond its necessity, insofar as it begins to view all political decisions as
expert matters, creating a “democratic deficit” that undermines its own
legitimacy. These are examples of the “colonization of the lifeworld” by systemic
imperatives. With the image of colonization, Habermas means to acknowledge the
dangers of Weberian rationalization that previous critical theorists recognized
while still maintaining a theoretical space for critical reflection and transformation
of these very systems.
I think that anyone who is sufficiently familiar with it would agree that
Habermas’ theory of communicative action provides a more sophisticated and
empirically accurate picture of how individuals come to linguistically mediated
agreements (including contractual agreements), and how such agreements come to
have normative force, than contract theory. However, it is not my purpose to
argue this point here. The more important point of comparison involves the
systemic dimension of his analysis, and the idea of systemic “colonizations” of
the lifeworld, for which there is no correlate in the contract model. If the idea of
“pure” institutional racism is defensible, it might find a qualified defense here, in
an explanation of how systems that have their origins in collective, intentional
action become “uncoupled” from that kind of intentional direction, and instead
take on an independent, self-sustaining character.14 That is, thinking about
institutional racism as a “colonization of the lifeworld” captures the initial
intentionality of racial oppression as well as the semi-autonomous character it
takes on once reified into systems. Once collective, willful racial oppression is
solidified in systems of law, “objective” economic imperatives, and so on,
oppressor groups are “unburdened” of the physical and psychological
requirements of oppressing. Whites, for example, can now enjoy all the privileges
of whiteness while simultaneously professing a cheery attitude of liberal
tolerance. They can enjoy higher wealth and wages without the moral turpitude
associated with expropriation. And they can hold the highest offices and positions
while resting assured that everyone else had “equal opportunity” to hold them as
well. In this way, the white psyche is insulated from the potentially damaging
effects of oppressing, and is thereby enabled to construct a positive individual
identity, supposedly separate from its membership in a particular group (the white
race).15 This psychological unburdening mirrors the physical unburdening of an
earlier system of slavery that literally unburdened white slave-owners of the labor
necessary for the production of material wealth.
8

Putting Habermas’ system and lifeworld framework to use for
understanding institutional racism in this way requires going beyond his
generalized account of the benefits and burdens of various systems, however. It
requires recognizing that the “vast and incalculable web of presuppositions”
underlying social interaction in countries like the United States includes various
racial presuppositions; in other words, it requires recognizing that the lifeworlds
of the denizens of such countries are racialized lifeworlds.16 Accordingly, the
benefits (unburdening functions) and burdens (colonizing functions) are not
equally distributed across a generalized lifeworld, but unequally distributed along
racial lines, in ways that are fundamentally unjust. This unjust distribution of
benefits and burdens is critical for understanding contemporary institutional
racism. So, while the system and lifeworld model of institutional agency may
provide a better understand of how institutions can come to embody moral
attitudes like disrespect, and may even provide a way of reconciling genetic
reductionism with cases of “pure” institutional racism, it also points to a very
different way of understanding institutional racism: as a matter of injustice rather
than disrespect. I will now turn to this alternative conception, and its advantages
over Glasgow’s disrespect analysis.
III.

RACISM AS INJUSTICE.

In order to demonstrate the inadequacy of Glasgow’s disrespect analysis for
understanding institutional racism, let me provide an alternative case of “pure”
institutional racism to consider alongside his Real Estate example. Call this
example the Toxic Doughnut Hole.17
The Toxic Doughnut Hole: On the outskirts of a major U.S. city, a predominately black
community is literally surrounded by landfills, sewage plants, chemical refineries, and
toxic dumps. The air, water, and soil are polluted at levels three to four times what is
considered safe. Rates of cancer, asthma, and emphysema, among other illnesses, are
more than double that of the general population. Furthermore, the industries surrounding
this community are inspected and cited less frequently by regulatory bodies than
comparable industries in white communities, and when they are cited for regulatory
infractions, the fines levied are consistently less than those imposed for comparable
violations in white communities. Let us suppose that the directors of these industries lack
any beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors that we would normally consider racist. The
motivation for locating their facilities here is purely economic: lower real estate prices,
lower taxes, favorable zoning regulations, and etc. Let us suppose further that in locating
their facilities here, these industries actually sought out the input and consent of the
neighboring community, thus extending them due respect. And let us suppose that, as an
economically depressed community desperate for jobs and tax revenue, the community
consented to the construction and location of the facilities.

Excepting the bit about seeking and receiving the consent of the affected
communities, situations similar to this have frequently been described as cases of
environmental racism, and I think the description is apt. If it is, the fact that the
disadvantage is not caused by the racist beliefs or actions of individuals makes it a
case of institutional racism. The question is: if such situations can be described as
9

racist, is it because they are disrespectful, as Glasgow would insist? If so, then the
introduction of consent, as evidence of respect, should be sufficient to make the
situation no longer racist. I think that it is not.
First, let us set aside all of the typical difficulties with consent that this
example raises. Let us presume that all community members, present and future,
consent to the construction of the facilities, that their consent was given with full
knowledge, and so on. So long as a systematic racial disadvantage remains, I
contend that extending respect to the affected parties does not preclude describing
the situation as racist. Rather, what makes this example (as well as Glasgow’s
Real Estate example) racist is that some individuals benefit undeservedly on the
basis of race, and others suffer undeservedly on the basis of race. Insofar as
systematic undeserved advantage and systematic undeserved suffering are unjust,
racism of this sort, institutional racism, is better understood as a distributive
injustice, or, more precisely, a systematically related set of distributive injustices,
producing systematic advantage or disadvantage depending on one’s race. To say
that the distributive injustices are systematically related means that they are, if not
interdependent, at least mutually supporting in ways that dispose those who suffer
from one to suffer from others as well. For example, the fact that AfricanAmericans have a rate of poverty nearly twice that of whites predisposes them to
suffer from other kinds of harm: poorer schools (given that educational funding is
frequently linked to property taxes), greater likelihood of being a victim of violent
crime and greater likelihood of imprisonment (presuming some link between
poverty and increased criminal activity), reduced access to commercial services
(since banks, grocery stores, and so on prefer to locate in neighborhoods with
greater disposable income), and etc.18 In turn, poor schools, high crime, etc.,
exacerbate poverty for current and future generations, perpetuating structural
disadvantage. This is oppression in its precise meaning, which Marilyn Frye
defines as including “situations in which options are reduced to a very few and all
of them expose one to penalty, censure or deprivation.”19 She illuminates this
experience through the metaphor of a birdcage. If one focuses on any single wire,
one cannot grasp why that wire impedes the bird’s motion. It is only when one
understands the systematic relation of the wires to one another that one can see
why the bird is immobilized. Institutional racism is a kind of oppression, and the
image of the birdcage illuminates its systematic nature.
The idea of disrespect fails to capture this kind of systematic disadvantage.
In the case of the Toxic Doughnut Hole, it is understandable that a community in
desperate need of jobs might consent to the building of job-producing industrial
facilities even if those industries had significant costs in terms of health. Yet even
when consent is sought and received, and when the affected parties are treated
respectfully, the situation is still unjust. The injustice lies in the fact that certain
communities are forced to make such choices in the first place. One needs to ask
(if not in the hypothetical example, at least in its real-life correlates) why certain
minority communities are forced to choose between jobs and health, between
living in safe neighborhoods and receiving fair treatment from police, between
10

quality education and personal safety, and so on. If minority communities are
consistently faced with such dilemmas more frequently than white communities,
one can describe the situation (and the society at large, if such situations are sufficiently
widespread) as racist. Moreover, the health-related disadvantages in this example

are systematically related to other disadvantages. As mentioned, the companies’
reasons for locating their facilities in this neighborhood are, we imagine, purely
economic. But we must ask why such incentives exist. Why are property taxes so
low? Presumably, the high crime, high unemployment, low income, and other
typical characteristics of impoverished communities play a role in creating this
economic incentive. Why are zoning regulations so lax? Perhaps because
impoverished communities are also frequently politically disenfranchised, and so
raise fewer effective complaints than better-situated communities. When one
begins to ask these questions, what emerges is a picture of some populations
systematically disadvantaged by various interrelated barriers, and other
populations systematically advantaged by those same barriers. That toxic waste,
landfills, and etc. are disproportionately located in poor, minority communities
means that they are disproportionately absent from well-off white communities,
who also probably benefit more from the products and processes that produce
such waste. That fewer mortgages go to “R2s” in Glasgow’s Real Estate example,
means that more are available to “R1s.” Put simply, when dealing with finite
resources, a disadvantage for one group creates an advantage for everyone else.20
This principle is straightforward, but frequently those who are willing to admit
that racial minorities face significant disadvantages resist making the logical step
of acknowledging that non-minorities thus enjoy significant advantages. That
these advantages and disadvantages track along racial lines means that they are
not based on merit, just transfer, or any other plausible criteria for distributive
justice. In short, they are undeserved. This is why they represent an injustice.
Institutional racism of this kind does not depend upon the ongoing
intentional malice of racist agents, though it does perhaps depend on the willful,
self-serving ignorance of advantaged populations. This is why institutional racism
can occur in the absence of individual racism. Frequently however, those who
attempt to give a general account of racism take immorality to be an essential
feature of racism, and so take it that any definition of racism must account for this
feature. One might wonder whether an institutional account of racism can do this.
Admittedly, insofar as an institutional account of racism, sees (this kind of)
racism as a property of systems, institutions, and structures that distribute benefits
and burdens in unjust ways, rather than as a property of persons, or their beliefs,
attitudes, actions, etc., it complicates the attribution of moral responsibility.
However, the complexity here mirrors a complex reality, one which admits of
various degrees of moral responsibility. For example, one could argue that it is
immoral to benefit from unjust inequalities, or from the suffering or oppression of
others, while recognizing that doing so is less morally egregious than actively
causing such suffering. It is not necessary, and probably not helpful, to label those
benefitting from unjust systems of institutional racism racists. But it is possible to
recognize a moral responsibility for unjust advantages.
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Focusing on injustice allows one to make important distinctions among
forms of racism. Glasgow notes rather dismissively in the beginning of his article
that “while there is some excitement over the proposition that only the most
powerful members of society can be racist within it, a consensus seems to be
emerging that just about anyone can be racist.”21 And while he doesn’t cite any
evidence of this emerging consensus, he does briefly return to the point at the end,
arguing that, though he is inclined to reject the view that racism requires power,
his disrespect analysis is neutral with regard to this question, holding that “if only
the most powerful can generate racial disrespect (which I doubt), then only the
most powerful can be racist.”22 Perhaps there is an emerging consensus that “just
about anyone can be racist,” if not in the academic literature, then at least in
popular wisdom. I do not doubt that racial minorities can have beliefs and
attitudes about whites that could be described as racist, nor that such beliefs and
attitudes can have real, serious effects, for example when they motivate hate
crimes against individual whites. There are reasons to hesitate about thinking that
all forms of racism are equally immoral, but let us set them aside here and
presume that they are. There is still an important difference between white and
anti-white racism: anti-white racism typically lacks the systemic uptake necessary
to become institutionalized, while white racism today is paradigmatically
institutional.23 Put another way, even if one assumes that all (individual, agentbased) racism is immoral, it does not follow that all racism is unjust. If one draws
the typical modern distinction between morality and justice in which morality
governs the character/actions/intentions of individuals, while justice governs
social institutions (and societies on the whole), it follows that only those forms of
racism that have become institutionalized or systemic should be evaluated in
terms of justice. Anti-white racism may be immoral, but white racism is
frequently both immoral and unjust, insofar as it encourages and is encouraged by
structural imperatives that systematically disadvantage non-white populations.
This is a critical insight, for reasons that I will make clearer in the next section,
and Glasgow’s disrespect analysis fails to capture it.
Finally, a dual perspective account like the one I am offering is nonreductionist. Some accounts of institutional racism may insist that, insofar as
individual beliefs, attitudes, and actions are shaped by social institutions, all
racism can ultimately be traced to institutional racism. Such a view actually
represents a third kind of reductionism, in addition to “time-slice” and “genetic”
reductionism. Just as one might understand institutional racism reductively, as
derivative of individual “agent-based” racism, one might conversely understand
individual racism reductively, as derivative of institutional racism, and be no less
a monist for it. Glasgow hints at such views when he mentions, in a footnote, that
even in the absence of individual agent-based racism, “institutional racism can
foster agent-based racism” anew, insofar as the inequalities produced by
institutional racism may encourage racist views about natural differences in
ability and so on.24 However, I think such an institutional reductionism is
ultimately mistaken as well, in part because it would be vulnerable to the criticism
about lacking an account of moral responsibilities for racism. My account
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however, does not insist that all racism is institutional, only that some is. It thus
retains a place for agent-based accounts of racism that focus on individual moral
responsibility for beliefs, actions, and etc. Still, I do think that the most persistent
and egregious kinds of racism that countries like the United States face today are
structural or institutional in nature, rather than individual, a point I will now turn
to.25
IV.

“ORDINARY USAGE” AND OTHER SEMANTIC ISSUES.

Glasgow’s attempt to define racism in terms of disrespect takes as its primary
adequacy criterion that a proper definition should “accommodate ordinary
usage.”26 Glasgow does not take this to preclude that the term to be defined is
“often used in contested ways,” but he nonetheless insists that “other things equal,
the more that an analysis can accommodate ordinary usage, the better.”27 Other
things, of course, are not equal. Rather, the deeply divisive racial inequalities in
places like the United States often produce significantly different estimations of
what counts as racism, and how prevalent it is. A recent poll, for example, shows
that black Americans are more than twice as likely as white Americans to say that
racism is a “very serious” problem.28 While this may be a result of differential
access to the kinds of experiences that would lead one to draw this conclusion, it
may also be the result of differences in the “ordinary” conceptions of racism held
by white and black Americans. Moreover, one can think of cases where a
particular action, belief, policy, etc. is considered by some to be racist, and the
precise opposite of that action, belief, policy etc., is considered racist by others.
Affirmative action, for example, is often characterized as racist by its detractors,
while its supporters sometimes label such opposition itself racist. More generally,
social policies that take race into consideration in any way are thought by some to
be racist, whereas others accuse such a naïve “colorblind” approach of
perpetuating racism. One may take instances such as these as prima facie
evidence that there are different accounts of racism at work in the opposing
judgments. If so, appealing to ordinary usage will not be helpful.
Worse yet, deferring to the ordinary usage of a morally and politically
loaded term like racism can actually discourage using the term in non-typical
ways that nonetheless might illuminate important features of social reality, like
the existence of unjust, systematic racial disadvantage. In fact, I think this is
precisely the problem with standard accounts of racism, which typically do reflect
the way the term is ordinarily used, a use that is deeply connected to the
individual, agent-based view, and therefore makes it difficult to recognize forms
of racism that don’t readily correspond to individual moral failings. In describing
institutions which systematically disadvantage some racial groups as “racist,” I
am admittedly parting with some forms of ordinary usage, but this is because
those forms are an impediment to recognizing some of the most harmful instances
of racial disadvantage. So, if abandoning ordinary usage must count as a cost of
my view, as Glasgow insists, then I take it that this cost is outweighed by the
benefit of being able to address the serious and egregious injustice of institutional

13

racism, which his own account fails to do, for the reasons outlined in the previous
pages.
In other words, ordinary usage cannot be taken as a neutral adequacy
criterion for defining socio-cultural terms like racism, because the meaning of
such terms depends upon changing social practices.29 Relying on ordinary usage
in spite of this begs the question of whether such usage requires revision in light
of certain social or historical facts. In the case of racism, my argument is that such
revisions are in fact necessary. Historians, sociologists, and philosophers alike
have demonstrated that contemporary (post-Civil Rights era) manifestations of
race and racism differ significantly from pre-Civil-Rights-era racism.30 For one,
racial discrimination has come to be prohibited de jure, and a corresponding nearconsensus has emerged that such forms of discrimination (as well as racist beliefs,
attitudes and practices more generally) are deeply immoral. Likewise, explicit
racial prejudice has, for the most part, become socially taboo, and so its public
manifestations have become predictably less prevalent.31 If one relies on an
“ordinary” conception that limits racism to the actions, attitudes, and beliefs of
individuals, one would be tempted to conclude from these facts (as many have)
that racism is no longer a serious problem, or at least not nearly as serious as it
once was. However, the inequalities in wealth, health, education, employment,
and virtually every other measure of well-being that accompanied the explicit
prejudice of the pre-Civil-Rights era have not similarly diminished, as one might
expect.32 The divergent courses of racial prejudice and racial inequality then,
seem to suggest that the latter is not dependent upon the former. Thus an
institutional or structural conception of racism like the one I have provided above
is necessary in order to explain the persistence of racial inequality in the
structures and institutions of civil society, separate from the beliefs, attitudes, and
actions of individual persons.
Still, one might wonder, why insist on describing the systematic racial
inequality that continues to mark the post-Civil-Rights era as a form of racism?
Why not reserve the term racism for phenomena involving intentional acts of
discrimination and speak, on the other hand, of racial injustice, racial inequality,
racial oppression, or even white supremacy? Lawrence Blum, for example, argues
that there is an important difference between a company that uses word-of-mouth
recruiting with the intention of excluding black applicants, and a company that
has no such intention, but achieves the same outcome. “The commonality,” he
suggests, “is best expressed by saying that both practices equally sustain racial
injustice or have a deleterious impact on black job seekers, not by saying they are
both examples of ‘institutional racism.’”33 His justification for reserving the term
racism for cases of intentional harm (institutional or individual) is two-fold. On
the one hand, he aims to resist an “all or nothing” approach to racism that
overlooks the various nuances between different kinds of “racial ills.” By
developing a vocabulary that reflects these differences, one can more easily
recognize that not all of the actions, attitudes and beliefs frequently referred to as
racist have the same moral value. That is, racial insensitivity may be bad, but not
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as bad as racial hatred, as expressed in hate crimes, for example. Similarly, an
institution that unintentionally furthered racial inequality may be bad, but one that
does so intentionally is worse.
I am sympathetic to Blum’s concern to reserve the term ‘racism’ for only
the most serious racial ills. But this is precisely why I think the term should be
used for (even unintentional) cases of institutional racism, since these, rather than
intentional acts of prejudice, are the most far-reaching, normatively pressing
varieties of racial ills present in society today. If the force of our considered
judgments about individual racial prejudice could be applied to the trenchant
racial inequalities still common in the United States today, perhaps we might
make some long overdue progress in addressing those inequalities, in the interest
of justice.
I also recognize the importance of distinguishing shades of moral
responsibility in relation to “racial ills,” as I mentioned above. For example, I
think those who merely benefit from institutional racism are less morally culpable
than those who actively promote it, and I think those who unknowingly benefit
from it are less morally culpable than those who knowingly do so. Indeed, one of
the reasons for providing a more detailed account of the relation between
seemingly independent systemic imperatives and the conscious, collective actions
of individuals is to capture the complex ways in which individuals can exert
conscious, collective control over complex systems, thus bringing them back
under the purview of morality (in addition to justice). Admittedly, I have not
focused extensively on the moral implications of my thesis, but I do think that
recognizing the existence and scope of contemporary institutional racism does
have such implications, for example, in regard to the question of whether one has
a moral duty to oppose unjust systems, or to refuse (where possible) undeserved
advantages.
But Blum presents a more pragmatic justification for his restricted usage
as well. He worries that the “conceptual inflation” of the term racism has
weakened its denunciative force; that since the term racism has come to be so
widely and diversely used, those that are accused of it may simply shrug it off, or
claim that their accusers are overly sensitive.34 In relation to institutional racism,
the worry seems to be that labeling certain institutions racist risks branding those
individuals involved with it as racists, and that such a label immediately puts such
individuals on the defensive, intent on denying the validity of the individual
charge by disputing the institutional one (or vice versa).
It does seem that expanding the term ‘racism’ to encompass structural
disadvantage risks alienating some whites, who understand the claim to entail that
their position of relative advantage makes them “racists,” as anyone who has
attempted to address issues of institutional racism in the classroom knows. White
students frequently, and somewhat justifiably object to any (perceived) inference
about their individual moral character based on structural features of their society
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that are (perceived to be) outside of their control. But this resistance is based on a
misunderstanding. While individual and institutional racism frequently overlap
(for example, when the latter is motivated by the racial malice of individuals), the
two are conceptually separable, as I have aimed to demonstrate in this essay. So,
condemning an institution as racist does not directly imply anything about the
moral standing of the individuals associated with it. When whites (or any other

relatively advantaged group) fully understand this, they can abandon the typical
reflexive, defensive posture, and approach institutional racism as participants in a
collective project in the interest of social justice.
On the other hand, some resistance to recognizing institutional racism
goes deeper than just labels. There may be good (prudential) reasons for whites to
resist having the advantages they enjoy characterized as the unjust effects of
institutional racism. Consciously or unconsciously, white resistance to claims of
institutional racism may be an attempt to secure and protect those resources that
have been accumulated over centuries of white supremacy. Charles Tilly calls this
“opportunity hoarding,” and argues that it typically characterizes the most
trenchant forms of social inequality, including racial inequality in the United
States.35 As I argued above, for whites to acknowledge that racial minorities are
structurally disadvantaged by institutional racism implies that their own
accomplishments are, at least in part, the product of structural advantages and are,
therefore, not entirely deserved. This kind of acknowledgement is made difficult
not only by our psychological makeup,36 but also by practical imperatives to
protect the resources and opportunities of oneself and one’s social group. These
are serious obstacles to eliminating institutional racism, deserving of more
consideration than I can give them here. My only point at present is that these
difficulties are not a result of using the language of racism to characterize the
advantage. The obstacle remains whether one describes such a state of affairs as
involving “racial injustice,” “racial disadvantage,” “racial inequality,” or
whatever other term one prefers.
So, while it is important to pay attention to the various degrees of moral
responsibility associated with institutional racism, and while it pays to think
carefully about how one makes the case for institutional racism in the classroom,
or in other settings, neither the principled nor the strategic objections to
characterizing structural racial disadvantage as racist ultimately succeed. Neither
do the concerns about departing from “ordinary usage” outweigh the value of
drawing attention to fundamentally unjust forms of social organization.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

I have argued here that Glasgow’s “disrespect analysis” of racism fails to capture
the essence of institutional racism, which is not a matter of respect, but of justice.
In making this case, I have tried to specify the relationship between individual and
institutional agency, something Glasgow’s analysis seems to me to require, but
fails to provide. While this effort does not ultimately vindicate Glasgow’s account
of institutional racism, it is a valuable task in its own right, insofar as it helps to
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illuminate the relationship between the individual beliefs, attitudes, and actions
that are most commonly described as racist, and the institutional arrangements
that structure opportunities and resources in ways that produce serious, systemic
racial injustice, and that may or may not be animated by individual racism.
Contract theory can be helpful to this end, as it illustrates the ways in which social
institutions can arise out of the conscious, collective will of individual agents.
However, contract theory fails to capture the other side of the equation: the ways
in which institutions, once established, can in turn exert pressure on individuals to
conform to institutional demands that appear to have a certain kind of autonomy.
This dimension of institutional agency is crucial for understanding how
institutional racism can continue virtually unabated even as individual racism
becomes less prevalent. When one understands the unburdening function of social
systems, the fact that extreme racial injustice can coexist with a superficial racial
tolerance is not at all puzzling. It is precisely because of the increasing complexity
and efficiency of social systems that intentionally racist enforcement of white
supremacy is no longer necessary. Systematic poverty, for example, combined
with a massive prison-industrial complex is far more effective at disenfranchising
black voters than the Ku Klux Klan could have ever been. And the corresponding
advantage to whites can be enjoyed without the pangs of conscience that might be
the result of active racial hostility. In order to capture the way in which
institutions can sustain racial advantage semi-autonomously, I have introduced
Habermas’ system/lifeworld framework, with the important qualification that the
benefits (unburdening functions) and harms (colonizing functions) of systems are
not evenly distributed across a generalized lifeworld, but depend significantly on
how one is positioned racially in society. This unequal and unjust distribution of
systemic benefits and burdens, rather than disrespect, is the key to understanding
institutional racism.
Finally, let me remind the reader that my injustice-based account of
institutional racism is not meant to supplant Glasgow’s view across the board.
That is, I am not claiming that all forms of racism must be understood in terms of
justice, only that institutional racism must. I suppose this makes my view
pluralist, as opposed to Glasgow’s monist view. But unlike, say, ontological
pluralism, a pluralist view of racism does not entail that individual and
institutional racism are distinct entities without overlap. Indeed, one of the
advantages of the system/lifeworld framework is its ability to illuminate the ways
in which the two are related; that is, the ways in which individual racism can
become institutionalized, and the ways in which institutional racism can produce
individual racism. Yet this is different from seeking to reduce the two phenomena
to one, based on some unifying feature like disrespect, or injustice. Given that
philosophers since time immemorial have been driven to discover the most basic
components of the world (both natural and social), I can certainly understand the
desire for a unified account. I do not think, however, that a pluralist (or “dual
perspective,” as I prefer to call it) view should be particularly troubling for social
theorists. Simplicity may be a theoretical virtue, but from a sociological
perspective, one should not be surprised if a particular social phenomenon admits
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of different levels of explanation, according to different models. It may be that in
some cases, such theoretical pluralism provides a richer account of the
phenomenon than any one theoretical framework alone. Such seems to be the case
with racism, notwithstanding Glasgow’s attempt to account for its many forms
under a single analysis.37
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